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ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyze the recent efforts of the international financial institutions to limit
the moral hazard created by their assistance to crisis countries.  We question the wisdom of the case-
by-case approach taken in Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and Ukraine.  We show that because default
and restructuring are so painful and costly, it is simply not time consistent for the IFIs to plan to
stand aside if the markets refuse to roll over maturing claims, restructure problem debts, or provide
new money.  Because these realities create an incentive to disburse even if investors fail to comply,
the IFIs are then placed in the position of having to back down on their previous conditionality,
which undermines their credibility.  And since investors are aware of these facts, their behavior is
unlikely to be modified by the IFIs’ less-than-credible statements of intent.  Hence, this approach to
“bailing in the private sector” will not work.  Fortunately, there is an alternative: introducing
collective-action clauses into loan agreements.  This, and not ad hoc efforts to bail in the private
sector, is a forward-looking solution to the moral hazard problem.
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Department of Economics The World Bank
University of California 1818 H. Street NW
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880 Washington, DC 20431
and NBER cruehl@worldbank.org
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2  Conservative estimates put crisis-related losses since 1997 at $240 billion for equity investors,
$60 billion for international banks, and $50 billion for other private foreign creditors (Haldane
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I. Introduction
Moral hazard is increasingly seen as a problem in international financial markets, and
private-sector burden sharing is increasingly seen as the solution.  Investors must bear at least
some of the costs of crises, the argument goes, if they are not to disregard the risks of lending. 
Ensuring that they do not escape all losses as a result of support provided by the international
financial institutions (IFIs) — seeing that investors, rather than being “bailed out,” are “bailed in”
— is central to any strategy for limiting moral hazard.  The failure of the IFIs to articulate a
coherent approach to this problem thus provides ammunition to those who insist that they are part
of the problem rather than part of the solution.
These are easy bromides on which to agree.  Moving from bromides to policies is harder. 
There is no agreement about how the costs of a crisis should be shared among the parties, much
less a mechanism for implementing that agreement.  Some argue that investors already bear their
fair share of the burden — witness, for example, the losses incurred by investors in Asian stock
and bond markets in 1997 and following Russia’s default in 1998.
2  They argue that attempts to1999).
3  This is not to say that bank debt is unimportant, only that it is likely to be less important in the
future than the past.  In any case, it is not the focus of this paper, since it is not the focus of bail-in
efforts in Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and Ukraine.  Courtesy of the crises in South Korea and
Thailand (and the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s), the international community now has
considerable experience with this problem, the solution to which involves assembling
representatives of the banks and negotiating their forbearance.  Observers who question whether
past “successes” can be repeated recommend the use of tax and regulatory policy to discourage
resident banks and corporations from funding themselves via short-term loans from foreign banks
in the first place.  See the discussion in Eichengreen (1999a).  Another suggestion (e.g. Buiter and
Siebert 1999) is to require bank loan agreements to include clauses providing for a debt-rollover-
with-penalty option.  While we are sympathetic to this approach, we are also skeptical: unlike the
collective action clauses in bond covenants discussed later in this paper, which actually exist in the
real world (some 40 per cent of the international bonds issued by developing countries in the
1990s are subject to U.K. governing law and therefore contain at least limited collective-action
provisions, as we explain below), debt-rollover-with-penalty options remain in the realm of
theory; we have no practical experience with them.
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impose additional losses on investors would render it less attractive to lend to developing
countries, which already find it costly to access international capital markets.   Creating a
presumption that crisis countries will regularly restructure their obligations would only weaken
the bonding role of debt.  Extending the policy to Brady bonds and eurobonds would hinder
efforts to create the clear seniority structure which is needed to support the international transfer
of capital.
While the critics have a point, neither is it feasible to simply let the moral hazard problem
fester.  Hence, the IFIs have been groping toward a strategy for addressing it, most recently in
their policies toward Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and Ukraine.  In all four cases, the focus of
their efforts is bonds, not bank loans like those which created such problems in Thailand and
Korea in 1997.  It is sovereign debts, not private debts like those which were the problem in
Indonesia.  Focusing on bonds is appropriate insofar as the ongoing process of securitization
makes them the wave of the future.
3  Focusing on sovereign debt is also appropriate insofar as4  This is one of the few regularities to emerge from the debt crises of the 1990s: those with claims
on the private sector (on nonfinancial corporations in particular) tend to incur more substantial
losses as a result of a crisis.  The problem is the tendency for governments to socialize these
losses by taking over private-sector entities in distress and assuming their financial obligations.  A
further problem is the inadequacy of existing bankruptcy and insolvency procedures, which leads
investors to scramble for collateral, thereby precipitating cascading defaults.  But the
corresponding solution is straightforward, namely, improving domestic bankruptcy procedures. 
This is a central element of the process of setting international financial standards (for prudential
supervision, auditing and accounting practice, corporate governance and bankruptcy and
insolvency codes) in which the IFIs are taking the lead.
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mechanisms already exist for restructuring private debts (namely, domestic bankruptcy and
insolvency procedures) through whose operation investors already take a “hit” when debt-
servicing problems arise.
4  But implementation of the new strategy has been far from smooth, and
considerable controversy has resulted.  
Our assessment is that the IFIs’ efforts to condition official assistance on “private sector
participation” -- specifically, on the willingness of investors to roll over maturing loans, provide
new money, or restructure existing debts -- have been less than a success.  The reason is not hard
to see.  A new strategy built on statements of intent that does not also change the underlying
payoffs will not be taken at face value.  Because it is not credible, it will not change the strategies
of market participants.  Therefore it will not change the results of their interaction with the
multilaterals and the debtor. 
In addition, these ad hoc initiatives to “bail in the private sector” have not set the desired
precedent.  The countries involved are small and have only limited access to international financial
markets.  Disputes over their debts are unlikely to have systemic repercussions, which explains
why they have been the subjects of these bail-in exercises in the first place.  But this also means4
that any private sector burden sharing that takes place will not be precedent setting.  This makes it
unlikely to ameliorate moral hazard in international financial markets. 
Finally, the current approach to private-sector burden sharing has a number of negative
side effects.  In some cases it has destroyed the rudimentary seniority structure that debtors and
creditors have sought to create.  In others it has substituted for impending debt-servicing
problems the prospect of an even more severe crisis in the not-too distant future — it has traded
bad today for worse tomorrow.  And it has undermined the credibility of the IFIs by committing
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to policies that are not credible or time
consistent, and on which they are unlikely to follow through.
For all these reasons, we believe that the approach taken in these test cases is misguided. 
The IFIs would do better to devote less attention to ad hoc efforts to bail in captive investors in
countries like Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and Ukraine.  They would do better to concentrate on
a forward-looking solution of more general applicability.  One option is to press for the
introduction of renegotiation-friendly provisions (collective action clauses) into future loan
contracts and to use World Bank adjustment lending and IMF contingent finance to strengthen the
incentives to move in that direction.  The introduction of collective action clauses would change
the payoffs in the game between the IFIs, investors, and the debtors.  It would therefore change
equilibrium strategies.  Unlike the present approach, it would make it possible for the IMF and the
World Bank to credibly commit to bailing in the private sector.5
II. Burden Sharing in Principle 
Efforts at achieving greater private-sector burden sharing are motivated by the perception
that IMF programs starting with Mexico have let investors off the hook and are a source of moral
hazard.  In addition, because the Fund is almost always paid back, these payoffs are effectively
transfers from the taxpayers in the crisis country to international investors.  On both efficiency and
equity grounds, then, the status quo is unacceptable.
Rules Versus Discretion.  American and European officials have advocated contrasting
approaches to the problem, the latter arguing for rules governing what investors will be bailed in
under what circumstances, the former preferring the “constructive ambiguity” of a case-by-case
approach.  In the European view, the IMF Executive Board should agree to a set of formulas and
procedures to be applied to emerging markets requiring assistance.  It should articulate the
circumstances under which debts would have to be restructured and/or new money provided by
the markets as a condition for multilateral support.  In the American view, no rules for bail-ins
should be promulgated in advance.  Each case should be considered on its merits, and procedures
should be tailored to the particular circumstances. 
The problem with rules is that investors will anticipate their application, with destabilizing
consequences.  If banks or bondholders regularly receive haircuts under a certain set of
circumstances, they will have an incentive to scramble out of the market the day before,
threatening to precipitate a crisis if they perceive even a remote possibility that those
circumstances will obtain.  A degree of constructive ambiguity is necessary, therefore, if bail-in
procedures are not to be destabilizing.  5  In addition, there is the feeling that the United States, as one country rather than a collection of
continental neighbors, can move quickly to formulate a position on a particular case, as a result of
which the Americans will dominate policy making under the case-by-case approach.  The U.S.
Treasury has the further advantage of proximity to the Fund, the Europeans argue, which positions
it to influence policy in particular cases.
6  To repeat what was said in the introduction, in focusing on Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and
Ukraine, we focus on problems of refinancing or writing down their bonds, which constitute the
bulk of the debt in question.  In previous cases (South Korea, Thailand), bank loans have instead
been involved, which pose a different set of issues that we do not consider here.
6
The problem with the case-by-case approach, the Europeans counter, is that it is a source
of uncertainty that will disrupt the market access of developing countries even in good times.  If
countries are required to impose losses on their creditors as a condition for receiving official
assistance, potential creditors may be reluctant to lend in the first place.  Insofar as a shadow is
cast over countries’ efforts to develop a well-defined seniority structure (since it now becomes
possible for senior debt to be restructured along with junior debt), those with a preference for
senior claims will no longer find emerging markets attractive.
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To date, the IMF has followed the case-by-case approach (IMF 1999a,b).  Attempts to
encourage private-sector burden sharing have taken two forms: writing down liabilities to private
investors; and encouraging the markets to provide “new money” or roll over existing claims.
6   No
rules have been promulgated for which debts should be written down as a condition for providing
official finance, how they should be written down, or by how much they should be written down. 
Similarly, no general principles have been articulated regarding the circumstances under which
investors should be required to provide new money as a condition for official assistance, how
much they should contribute, or the terms on which they should contribute.  In a sense, then,
these four cases have been experiments with the American approach. 7  In other words, in addition to earning interest, the new money may raise the value of pre-
existing claims.
8  There is now some experience with this approach, as we will see below.
7
New Money.  Securing new money has been difficult.  In the unsettled climate that
surrounds a crisis, investors prefer to hold off extending additional credit until the uncertainty has
been at least partially resolved.  If there is even the possibility that the government lacks the
willingness or capacity to pay, investors will be reluctant to increase their commitments, and the
country’s liquidity needs will have to be met by the IFIs.  The latter can ask the markets to
provide matching money, but given the option value of waiting, a positive response cannot be
guaranteed.
Collective-action and free-rider problems compound these difficulties.  To be sure, new
money, by allowing a country to surmount an otherwise disruptive liquidity crisis, can have a high
rate of return.
7  But even if investors as a group are better off if they ante up additional funds,
each investor may nonetheless prefer that others provide the new money needed to solve the
problem.  The share of private money will approach zero as collective-action problems grow more
severe.
The IFIs could condition their disbursements on the markets first agreeing to provide new
money.
8  Imagine that a costly default can be averted only if the markets and the multilaterals ante
up, but the multilaterals announce that they will not contribute unless the markets do so first. 
Knowing that they will suffer the consequences of a costly default if they fail to organize a
response, investors have an incentive to find a way around their collective-action problem.  This,9  Boughton (2000) is a comprehensive account of these cases.
10  The only options left to the debtor may then be full payment (the outcome that the bail-in
strategy is designed to avoid) or a costly and extended interruption of market access during which
neither private nor official funds are available, which would hardly be viewed as a desirable
outcome by any of the parties concerned.
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it will be recalled, was the IFIs’ strategy for encouraging concerted lending to crisis countries in
the early 1980s.
9
But this approach can be applied only to captive investors, like the banks that extended the
loans that came to grief in the early 1980s.  In the case of securitized debt, this strategy is
impossible to implement once bonds are distributed on secondary markets, given the absence of
mechanisms to encourage collective action by the creditors.
Moreover, default is costly for the country as well as its creditors and, by implication, for
the IFIs that have the country’s interests at heart.  Given the difficulty of restructuring sovereign
bond contracts, a default may result in an extended period during which all market access is lost. 
Since investors are aware of this fact, giving them veto power over multilateral disbursements
arms them with an additional weapon to be used in their skirmish with the country.
10  Moreover,
investors may doubt, with good reason, that the IFIs are really prepared to stand aside unless the
markets ante up new money.  They may believe that the multilaterals will offer assistance in the
end whether the markets provide new money or not, in order to avoid even more costly
disruptions.  It follows that the new policy, predicated purely on statements of intent, is not
credible and leaves the status quo unchanged.
It may have been this realization that led the IMF to its new policy of lending even when a
country is in arrears on its bonds as well as its bank loans.  Recent Executive Board decisions
permit the Fund to lend to a country even when the latter is in arrears to private creditors, so long11  Lending into sovereign arrears is something that the Fund has long done when a government is
making a concerted effort to adjust and has shown good faith in its negotiations with the creditor
community.  The September 1998 decision by the Fund’s Executive Board merely broadened the
policy from bank loans to incorporate bonds and other nonbank credits. 
12  This is evident in the terms of the IMF Executive Board’s decision to lend into arrears, which
authorized the policy only under circumstances where the borrower is engaged in good-faith
negotiations that are likely to clear away the overhang of nonperforming debt at a relatively early
date.
9
as it is making good faith efforts to negotiate and adjust.
11   The provision of official funds gives
the country the essential liquidity it needs to survive the interruption of market access, and the
fact that official funds are not conditioned on a prior agreement with investors may induce the
latter to accept less than 100 cents on the dollar.  Hence, IMF money that goes in the front door
does not automatically go out the back door as payoffs to private investors.  The moral hazard
problem is lessened.
But is lending into arrears a feasible way of securing private sector participation?  We
think not.  Debt restructuring is such a complex and messy process that this strategy is likely to
result in extended negotiations and an unfeasibly large drain on the resources of the IFIs.
Restructuring.  Substituting official funds for private funds is impractical and undesirable
for an extended period.
12  The point of the bail-in exercise is to rely more on market discipline and
less on official finance.  This makes lending into arrears problematic if it is not possible to clear
away the arrears and restore market access promptly.  Both theory (the theory of incomplete
contracts -- Hart 1995) and evidence (Suter 1992, Aggarwal 1996) suggest that an agreement to
clear away arrears can be difficult to reach.  The efforts of various crisis countries to avoid being
declared in default and their resistance to multilateral pressure to go down the restructuring road
are testament to their perception that the costs of restructuring are high.13  The discussion here draws on Eichengreen and Mody 2000.
14  Although there are exceptions.  Some US-style bonds also provide for amendments, even to
payment terms, with the approval of a qualified majority of bondholders.
15   Typically 75 per cent.  Some covenants provide for lowering the necessary quorum to 25 per cent
if 75 per cent of the bondholders cannot be reached.
10
The crux of the matter is thus the very great difficulty of restructuring sovereign debts
under prevailing institutional arrangements.
13  Most emerging market bonds are bearer bonds; not
only are they widely disbursed, but their owners are not registered with the debtor, the
underwriter, or anyone else.  This can make it difficult for a government to get in touch with its
bondholders to avoid a formal declaration of default, the activation of acceleration and cross-
default clauses and the initiation of legal action, which will then close off other avenues of credit
market access.  
Moreover, American-style instruments, governed by New York law, typically require the
unanimous consent of the bondholders to the terms of a restructuring.  Many US-style bonds do
not even provide for a bondholder assembly, precluding any effort to modify payment terms (and
other bondholder rights) without the consent of each and every bondholder.
14  This contrasts with
bonds governed by UK law, which typically include provisions enabling the holders of debt
securities to call a bondholder assembly empowered to pass extraordinary resolutions addressing
issues relating to the settlement of defaults or other modifications to the original bond covenant
subject to the consent of bondholders holding a clear majority of the outstanding principal.
15  Such
resolutions are binding on all bondholders so long as the requisite majority has agreed.  American-
style bonds generally contain no prohibition on legal action by dissident bondholders, exposing16   UK bonds governed by Trustee Deed Agreements, but not those involving fiscal agents, generally
prohibit individual bondholders from initiating litigation.  The power to do so is vested with the
trustee, acting on the instruction of creditors holding a specified fraction, typically, at least 25 per
cent of the principal, who is required to distribute any funds recovered in proportion to the principal
amount.
17  This was suggested in 1996 by the G-10 in its post-Mexico report (G10 1996) and echoed in a
series of recent G-22 and G-7 reports and declarations.  The G-7 then placed the issue on its work
program for reforming the international financial system with the goal of reaching a consensus by the
Cologne Summit in June of 1999.  Two recent discussions of the operation of such provisions are
Yanni (1999) and Drage and Mann (1999).
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those seeking to restructure to lawsuits from “vultures” seeking to hold up the restructuring
process.
16
Collective Action Clauses.  This brings us to the other approach to encouraging private
sector burden sharing: amending loan contracts to include sharing, majority voting, and collective-
representation clauses so as to make restructuring a viable option.  Majority voting and sharing
clauses would discourage maverick creditors from resorting to lawsuits and erecting other
obstacles to a settlement beneficial to the debtor and the majority of creditors.  Clauses specifying
who represents the bondholders and making provision for a bondholders committee or meeting
would allow orderly solutions to be reached.
17
Such modifications of loan contracts would solve, or at least greatly ameliorate, many of
the problems identified above.  The restructuring of problem debts could be left to the consenting
adults involved.  Greater reliance on the markets is after all the purpose of the bail-in exercise. 
Countries that attach a high value to the maintenance of market access would be free to take the
extreme measures needed to keep current on their debts, while restructuring would now be viable
for countries without the same capacity to adjust and which therefore attach priority to obtaining
an immediate reduction in debt-servicing costs.  Countries that value a well-defined seniority18  As The Economist put it in a leader, “the prospect of an orderly renegotiation rather than a messy
default might actually make some bonds more attractive” (Economist 1999, p.21).
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structure could choose to restructure junior debts while leaving senior debts untouched.  Asking
for new money even where it was not needed as an alternative to haircuts, which under present
arrangements can be impossibly difficult to administer and which are unattractive even to the
borrower, could be avoided because it would now be feasible to restructure instead.  Limited IMF
lending into arrears would become feasible if renegotiation-friendly provisions in loan contracts
could be used to avert a major financial drain and extended loss of market access.
There are two objections to this approach.  First, adding collective-action clauses to new
loan agreements would not solve the problems created by the existing stock of bonds.  The
average term to maturity of international bonds is on the order of five years, but some have as
long as 20 years to run.  However, new provisions could be added to existing loans through a
voluntary exchange of old bonds for new ones.  Some bondholders might resist, but the IFIs could
help the debtors buy them out by providing concessionary finance for such operations.
The second objection is that renegotiation-friendly provisions would make it too easy for
countries to walk away from their debts.  Collective-action clauses would weaken the bonding
role of debt.  They would create moral hazard.  They would disrupt credit-market access and raise
borrowing costs.  On the other hand, provision for orderly restructurings would make emerging-
market issues more attractive by minimizing acrimonious disputes, unproductive negotiations, and
extended periods when no service was paid and growth was depressed by a suffocating debt
overhang.
18  In theory, the impact on spreads cuts both ways.13
The empirics of collective-action clauses have been analyzed by Eichengreen and Mody
(2000), who compare the spreads on otherwise equivalent bonds issued under U.S. and UK  law
(where the latter typically contain the relevant contractual provisions but the former do not).  The
results do not indicate a large impact on borrowing costs.  But this negligible overall impact
disguises very different effects on borrowers with worse and better credit ratings.  Collective-
action provisions reduce the cost of borrowing for the most credit-worthy issuers, for whom
default is unthinkable except in extremis, but who benefit from being able to avail themselves of
an orderly restructuring when those exceptional circumstances obtain.  For less credit-worthy
issuers, in contrast, there is evidence of higher spreads.  We conjecture that for less credit-worthy
borrowers the advantages of provisions facilitating orderly restructuring are offset by the moral
hazard and additional default risk associated with the presence of renegotiation-friendly loan
provisions.
These results do not support the dire consequences of including collective-action clauses
suggested by some market participants.  Moreover, the differential effects suggest that collective-
action clauses should become more attractive as emerging markets improve their credit
worthiness.  If the goal of reforming the international financial architecture is to strengthen market
discipline by encouraging investors to more generously reward more credit-worthy borrowers and
penalize less credit-worthy ones, then the more widespread adoption of collective-action clauses,
which would reduce borrowing costs for the more credit worthy while raising them for their less
credit-worthy counterparts, would seem to be a step in the right direction.19 BIS data often paint a more accurate picture of the capital account than national balance-of-
payments sources.
20  Where debt to private creditors is only a minuscule proportion of the total.  Prior to the Asian
crisis, this had been accompanied by a growing importance of both claims on the private sector
(Figure 1) and lending from official sources (Figure 2).  Both declined following the crisis though
this decline was generally less pronounced for the share of private creditors.  Interesting, bilateral
creditors cut their lending in all four countries well before the onset of the Asian crisis. 
Thereafter, the share of private creditors falls everywhere except for Romania.  This shift is
confirmed by the subsequent rise in the share of public- and publicly-guaranteed debt in total long-
term debt, a ratio which was in decline prior to the crisis.
21  Although this trend was interrupted in 1999, when secondary markets became difficult to
access and bail-in requirements began to bite.  
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III. Burden sharing in practice
To date, efforts to encourage private-sector burden sharing have attempted to involve the
private sector in re-financing or rolling over existing obligations on an ad hoc basis.  The
obligations have been bonds; the debtors have been sovereigns.  The four test cases have been
Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and Ukraine.  
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the debt situation in these countries using national accounts
and Bank for International Settlements data.
19  Debt and debt service have been on the rise in all
four countries.  There has been a decline in the relative importance of long-term debt, with the
possible exception of Pakistan, although multilateral finance has risen, in both absolute and
relative terms, thereby filling the gap.
20  The growing importance of claims on the private sector is
evident in all four countries.
21
Notwithstanding these similarities, these four countries had fundamentally different
problems when they became the subjects of the IFI’s efforts to encourage private sector
participation.  Ecuador and Pakistan were experiencing very serious economic and political crises,
creating reasons to doubt they had the capacity to service their heavy inheritance of debts.  Both22  Given the structure of the debt, Paris Club negotiations do not figure importantly in Ecuador’s
story.  The Paris Club eventually agreed to consider a multi-year restructuring, but only after an
IMF program was in place.
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countries subsequently defaulted on their international obligations.  Pakistan incurred sanctions as
a result of its nuclear tests and a loss of investor confidence as a result of its military coup, while
Ecuador has suffered a very severe recession and continuing political unrest, including a short-
lived military takeover.  Ukraine and Romania, in contrast, have relatively light debt loads, as is
typical of the transition economies, but sharp repayment peaks that will create liquidity problems
unless their maturing debts are rolled forward.  Romania has managed to meet its obligations to
date, while Ukraine is in the process of restructuring.
As this diversity of circumstances makes clear, it would be difficult for even the most
ambitious international financial architect to design a single procedure suitable to all of them.  Yet
despite the differences in initial conditions, the case-by-case approach to dealing with their
problems has followed a broadly similar pattern and encountered similar problems in all four
instances.
Ecuador.  Ecuador is the most high profile of the four test cases because it was the first to
formally default on its international debt.  Ecuador’s external obligations are dominated by debt to
private creditors (see the top-right panel of Figure 2).  Almost half of the total foreign sovereign
debt of $13 billion is in Brady bonds, while only $1 billion is owed to bilateral creditors.   
In the summer of 1999, Ecuador sought to negotiate a new IMF program, whose
conclusion was a precondition for the release of money committed by the World Bank and the
Interamerican Development Bank.
22  The problem facing the government was a fiscal and balance-
of-payments crisis.  The fiscal balance was deteriorating, and in the context of high unemployment
and extreme poverty the government lacked the political support needed to raise taxes sufficiently23  Although the final impact remained limited,  J.P. Morgan’s emerging market index showed an
increase of borrowing costs (with the spread rising from four to seven percentage points above
US Treasuries) in reaction to news from Ecuador (Fuerbringer 1999). Commentators warned that
spreads for emerging market borrowers in good standing would react to the IFs acquiescence to
policies compromising an instrument explicitly designed to reschedule loans which could not be
serviced in the past (Luce and Moss 1999). In addition, bondholders demanded that IFIs
themselves be no longer exempted from sharing the costs of the default (Remond 1999).
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to continue servicing its foreign debts in full while at the same time defaulting on a variety of
domestic social and political obligations.  The markets appear to have anticipated the country’s
repayment problems: Figure 4 indicates a steady erosion of the spreads on Ecuador’s eurobond
since the beginning of 1999 (after its bonds had recovered from the Russian crisis in parallel with
other emerging markets).  Nevertheless, there was considerable uncertainty in the first half of the
year about whether the government would stop paying, or whether it might somehow come up
with the resources needed to service its debts.   
When negotiations with the IMF bogged down in the summer of 1999, the markets
reacted negatively.
23  In August, President Jamil Mahuad announced that the authorities had
decided not to pay $96 million of interest due on a subset of the country’s $6 billion worth of
Brady bonds, whose interest and principal were collateralized.  Apparently the authorities’
expectation (and that of their foreign advisors) was that this would force the bondholders to come
to the table to negotiate restructuring terms.  The country bought time and avoided immediate
default by paying interest on its non-collaterilized Brady bonds (past due interest (PDI) bonds)
while asking investors in collateralized Brady bonds (Discount bonds) to use the 30 day grace
period to authorize the release of interest collateral.  
Using this collateral to make interest payments would have avoided a formal default on the
Discount bonds (and the activation of cross default clauses affecting other instruments) and
provided a breathing space for restructuring negotiations.  Presumably this was why the Brady24  Ecuador’s Brady bonds were issued in 1995 at a 40 percent discount to re-schedule sovereign
loans from western banks. The idea behind asking holders of collateralized bonds to release rolling
interest collateral, i.e. to initiate exchanging the collateralized Brady’s into new long term unsecured
domestic securities by dangling the immediately available collateral to bondholders, was not viewed
favorably by many of the bondholders. The group of bondholders in favor of accepting collateral in
lieu of interest payments and of entering into restructuring talks consisted largely of cash strapped
domestic banks. The second group, arguing in favor of accelerating the bonds to enforce payment of
the principle and to secure access to all collateral including that for principal, consisted mostly of
foreign creditors and others critical of the long term prospects of Ecuador’s economy. After the
decision to accelerate, unhappy bondholders appear to have legal options which threaten to tie up the
courts for a long time to come.
25  25 per cent of the creditors were formally required to accelerate, but the legal options of the
remaining bondholders appear to include litigation (Oxford Analytica 1999).
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bonds were chosen as the first instrument to restructure, and why the IFIs acquiesced.  The
authorities subsequently offered to swap Brady bonds for long term domestic bonds in a voluntary
debt exchange, while using the interest collateral as a sweetener to encourage the creditors
holding Discount bonds to engage in restructuring talks.
24 
In the event, investors dissatisfied by these terms called the necessary quorum of 25 per
cent of all bondholders to vote for acceleration before the authorities could marshal an agreement
to restructure.
25  Ecuador was asked to accelerate the principal on its outstanding Brady bonds,
constituting the first default on these instruments since their inception in 1990.  On 25 October
the country also failed to meet its eurobond coupon payments, and it is currently seeking to
restructure its private sector external debt.
The markets’ presumption throughout this period was that the IMF would condition its
assistance on a prior agreement between the country and its creditors to restructure or refinance. 
Speculation was widespread that, in the absence of such an agreement, the Fund would “force”
Ecuador to default.  On September 27th -- three days before the government was informed of the
decision to accelerate -- the Fund issued a statement that it would not insist that the country reach
an agreement with the holders of its Brady bonds as a precondition for official assistance; all that26  Ecuador’s government and congress, for their part, did not play a particularly effective role in
rescheduling the foreign debt.  Its efforts to contact the bondholders came too late, and it sent no
clear message regarding its intentions and responsibilities.  For the most part, it simply reacted to
an increasingly public debate on whether the IFIs had decided to force Ecuador to become the
first country to default on Brady bonds.
27  Agnelli and Gavin (1999) emphasize this point.
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was required were good-faith negotiations.  While this decision was consistent with the Fund’s
policy of lending into arrears, it did not enhance the institution’s reputation for consistency,
coming as it did after weeks of silence which was widely read as implying that the Fund would
lend only if Ecuador restructured first.  Moreover, the Fund’s belated announcement may also
have been wrongly interpreted by the Ecuadorians as “approval of” or “support for” nonpayment.  
It does not appear that the IFIs warned the authorities that attempting to continue servicing some
debts while suspending payment on others would be seen by the markets as “low play.”  It does
not appear that they warned the Ecuadorians that selective nonpayment was more likely to
activate cross-default and acceleration clauses than to drive the creditors to the bargaining table.
Ecuador’s experience illustrates the difficulty of arranging an orderly restructuring when
the appropriate legal and institutional means are absent.
26   It is not possible to drive the
bondholders to the negotiating table when there is no negotiating table to be driven to.  And
contrary to the government’s expectations, this selective default did major damage to the
country’s credit worthiness.  In particular, the concentration on Brady bonds destroyed the
existing seniority structure, hitting collaterized Bradys before noncollateralized Bradys
notwithstanding the market’s presumption that the former were senior to the latter,  which is
likely to drive away potential future senior creditors.  It affected domestic bond holders unevenly,
i.e. only to the extent to which cross default clauses were activated.
2728  See Fuerbringer 1999, Luce and Moss 1999, and Moody’s 1999b for three such reports.
29  At the same time, both are in the midst of a historical process of transformation, as a result of
which borrowing needs and repayment capacity differ from those of other emerging markets with
similar per capita incomes.  
30  At the beginning of 1999, Ukraine owed approximately $11.5bn, with a debt to GDP ratio
of 27%. Of this amount, $1.8 billion was due to private creditors, $3.5 billion to foreign energy
suppliers (mostly Gasprom), $1.8 billion to bilaterals and $4.4 billion to IMF and the World
Bank.  Repayments in 2000-1 total $5.5 billion. 
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Finally, the precedential value of the exercise is dubious.  Given the prospect of extended
negotiations and the markets’ negative reaction, officials regarded it as necessary to reassure
investors that the Ecuadorian precedent would not be allowed to affect the holders of other Brady
bonds or even other Ecuadorian debt instruments.  IMF and U.S. Treasury officials were reported
as providing reassurances that no spill-over would be allowed from Ecuador to other emerging
markets.
28  By suggesting that what had happened in Ecuador would not be allowed to happen
elsewhere, the IFIs diminished the precedential value of the experiment.
Ukraine.  Circumstances in Romania and Ukraine differ from those of the other two
subject countries.  The two transition economies both benefit from the fact that the debt burden,
at less than 30 per cent of GDP, is relatively light, something which is true for most transition
economies, which had limited access to credit markets or had taken extraordinary steps to
liquidate the debt.  (See Figures 2B and 2C.)  Nonetheless, borrowing decisions since the
beginning of the transition have created payment peaks which may be too steep to surmount.
29  
Different from the other cases, Ukraine already concluded several exercises in debt
rescheduling prior to the elaboration of the new policy.  These involved restructuring a fiduciary
loan and domestic treasury bills held by foreigners in the autumn of 1998 and again in June of
1999, both while an IMF program was in place.
30  A three-year extended Fund facility effective
since September 1998 (and on hold between November 1998 and March 1999) that recently31  It also restructured another bond due in the autumn of 2000.
32  See Clover (1999), Evans (1999) and Rutter (1999) for the perception this maneuver created
in the financial press.
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resumed disbursements includes reserve targets implying that these repayment peaks cannot be
met and principal can not be repaid under realistic assumptions about privatization receipts.  The
program therefore implies that the country’s obligations will have to be restructured, a process
which was underway as this paper went to press.
In June 1999, a bullet payment of $160 million came due on an indexed bond largely held
by one investor, the Honk Kong-based Regent Pacific Group.  When the government decided not
to pay on the grounds that the IMF’s reserve target did not permit it, Regent Pacific refused to
consider restructuring during the automatic ten day grace period following the nonpayment,
subsequently extended several times, threatening to declare the country in default and to invoke
cross-default and acceleration provisions.  That Ukraine in fact had the resources to make the
$160 million payment -- it possessed more than $700 million of reserves at the time -- was surely
one factor encouraging its creditor to insist on full payment. 
Faced with Regent Pacific’s ultimatum, Ukraine managed to make the payment while
avoiding violation of the IMF’s reserve target.
31  It scraped together the resources by re-opening a
eurobond due in 2001, repayment of which constitutes the last and the largest of the country’s
impending repayment peaks.  The Ukrainian authorities and their bankers “tagged onto” this bond
an additional issue, adding DM538 million to the DM1 billion eurobond due in the Spring of
2001.  The proceeds were used to finance Regent Pacific’s exit.  But in fact little cash was raised,
and most of the additional issue was swapped at attractive rates against claims on another bond
due in the autumn of 2000.  Figure 5 illustrates the consequences, namely a staggering repayment
peak in March of 2001.
32 33  The remarkable recovery of Ukraine’s eurobond prices after the Russian crisis appears to
reflect an assessment of the country’s solvency rather than its liquidity.
34  Commerzbank (2000), p.1.  Included are the E516 million international bond issue due in
March, the $258 million zero-coupon bond due in September, a $74 million Chase amortizing
bond due in October, the DM1.5 billion international bond due in February 2001, and $300
million in other bonds due in 2000 and 2001.
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The effect has been to maximize the size of the wall against which repayment efforts will
ultimately run.  Instead of a series of smaller liquidity crises, the country now faces the prospect
of a mammoth crisis in 2001.  Not surprisingly, the creation of this repayment peak depressed the
price of the 2001 bond from above 80 cents on the dollar to 40 cents (see Figure 6) and dried up
Ukraine’s access to the retail market.
33  
The new burden-sharing strategy did nothing to avert these dangers.  The IFIs issued no
public warnings about repayment peaks.  They did not intervene in rescheduling negotiations to
advocate certain types of instruments over others, to promote legal or institutional provisions to
improve the organization of bond restructuring in the future, or to insist on the need to smooth
the repayment schedule.  Their official position was limited to insisting that reserves could not be
used to repay private creditors.
With an insurmountable repayment peak looming, in the opening days of 2000 Ukraine
appointed ING Barings to lead-manage a syndicate of banks charged with convincing investors to
accept a new eurobond in exchange for their maturing issues.  The bulk of these bonds are to be
exchanged for eurobonds maturing in seven years, denominated in euro or U.S. dollars, and
bearing 10 per cent and 11 per cent coupons, respectively, with an initial six month grace period
for amortization.
34  Issuing bonds that can be amortized over seven years is more sensible than
creating another repayment peak.  But this conversion is likely to be more difficult than the 1998-
1999 restructuring of domestic treasury bonds, because holdings are more widely disbursed and35  Thus, the 1999 restructuring did not trigger cross-default clauses in Ukraine’s outstanding
eurobonds because the restructured bond was governed by Ukrainian law.
36  For this reason, the lead manager has specified that 85 per cent of current bondholders must
agree before the restructuring proposal can become effective; otherwise, it would be prohibitively
expensive to buy off the holdouts.
37 The remaining $22 million was not really new money but bookkeeping gains from buying back
outstanding bonds at sub-par prices.
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there exist cross-default clauses.
35  Because the most widely held bond is subject to New York
law, there is the danger of bondholder lawsuits, which will hold hostage the entire restructuring
process.
36  Nonetheless, the IMF has again made the conclusion of a comprehensive rollover a
precondition of the resumption of the program suspended last September.
Romania.  Romania faced bullet repayments on two obligations in May and June 1999 –
one a Samurai bond of $460 million, the other a eurobond of $245 million.  Both issues,
contracted in 1996, were distributed among German and Japanese retail investors.  As a
precondition for the IMF Standby negotiated in the spring and summer of 1999, the Fund required
the country to roll over 80 per cent of that debt.  Predictably, this demand came to nothing: with
both bonds trading on secondary markets, all the former lead managers had to do was to point out
that they had no bonds left in their inventories.  Faced with this reality, the IMF changed course,
conditioning its program instead on the country raising $600 million of new money (roughly equal
to the amount of the original rollover request).  
In the event, Romania managed to raise only $130 million.  The vast majority, $108
million, came in form of a “club loan” from a consortium of commercial banks already active in
the country.
37  The idea that the country might raise additional funds from its bondholders came to
naught.  
This outcome was reminiscent of the debt crisis of the 1980s.  Then too the IMF had
conditioned its programs on the creditors first agreeing (in principle) to ante up additional funds38  Figure 8 shows how sensitive the spreads of a Romanian eurobond maturing in 2001 reacted to
the developments leading up to the payment: The recovery from the impact of the Russian crisis
was accelerated in the Winter by positive political developments. In early Spring, prices start to
reflect the increasing fear of a pending sovereign default – alleviated in late Spring by public
announcements that the World Bank was ready to go to Board with a new program and that the
IMF had resumed negotiations with the government. As soon as these two programs were
concluded, the price of the eurobond clearly indicates that subsequent demands of non-payment
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(Cline 1995).  So long as success hinged on the efforts of a small, cohesive group of creditors
who feared that their solvency would be threatened by a failure to provide additional resources,
this “concerted lending” strategy could work.  But once the banks had provisioned against losses,
they refused to participate further.  The danger that this would hold IMF agreements hostage, at
considerable cost to the crisis country, was what led the Fund to adopt its new policy of lending
into arrears, breaking the link between its disbursements and new private lending.  In a sense,
then, the “innovation” of the Romanian program was a step back to the old, untenable state of
affairs, allowing a large, loose collection of creditors, retail bondholders among them, to hold
official money hostage. 
Romania then used its reserves to redeem both the eurobond and the Samurai bond as they
matured without IFI support, i.e. before Bank and Fund programs were formally in place.
Reserves fell to their low point immediately following these repayments (Figure 7).  They then
recovered (reflecting the beneficial balance of payments effects of a large currency depreciation in
the Spring and renewed efforts at structural reform).  By October reserves exceeded the Fund’s
target by some $300 million.
Despite the fact that the condition of raising $600 million of new finance was not met, in
the summer of 1999 the IMF decided to disburse the first tranche of its Standby Agreement with
Romania anyway.  It did so despite the country having paid off its creditors, contrary to the spirit
of the bail-in strategy.
38 However, the Fund limited its first disbursement to the minimum accesson part of the Fund (until May and June), and threats of discontinuing the Standby if the necessary
new money was not raised, did not carry weight with investors: spreads stayed low, and the
anticipation obviously was that the Fund and Bank programs would not be thrown off track by the
demand for burden sharing. 
39  As the Romanian press never tires of pointing out, the IFIs in fact may have helped to impair
the country’s credit-market access by associating it with bail-in “basket cases.”
40  Once again, by the time the decision was made, it altered the signal to the markets in
unintended ways.  Reflecting wide-spread sentiment, the Wall Street Journal on Nov. 4, 1999,
concluded that the IMF, after having “made Romania a poster child for its campaign to force
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to quota possible and set as a condition for the release of further tranches that new money be
raised to the tune of the missing $470 million.
The irony was that Romania’s need for new money was hardly pressing.  It had managed
to retire the debt which caused the problem and was over-performing on external targets like the
current account deficit and currency reserves.  
But not raising new money would have jeopardized the Standby, which was important for
market confidence.  The Romanian authorities, together with two investment banks, therefore set
off on a road show to prepare the markets for the issue of a new eurobond and possibly a
Samurai.  In the unsettled conditions of mid-1999, Romania was the only country possessing a
non-investment grade (B- and B3) rating with the temerity to approach the markets.  Investor
response was predictably tepid.  Failing to attract much interest in Europe, the road show, by the
time it reached the U.S., had become a ghost show.  Tapping the Samurai market disappeared
from the agenda.
39  
Predictably, the consequences were unpalatable for the IFIs as well as the country.  The
IMF responded by reducing the sum required prior to first review to a more modest $100 million
but without foreswearing the option of again raising the issue before releasing further tranches. 
Nevertheless, the gesture -- extended slightly earlier than the letter issued a few days before
Ecuador’s default -- was widely read as giving in to the fact Romania could not raise new funds.
40private investors to help rescue countries facing financial crises” had now “backed down and cut
the amount of private money that Romania would have to raise.”
41  While the Paris Club took the lead, it is important to note that this initiative took place while an
IMF program was in place.
42  The country’s bilateral Paris Club debt stands at approximately $3.3 million at the time of
writing, its sovereign bond debt to private creditors is split into two floating rate notes and two
sovereign bonds worth a total of $750 million. One of them, $150 million worth, fell due in
December 1999, and by December 2000, an additional $470 million worth of bonds would have
matured. In June of 1999, Pakistan rescheduled commercial bank loans worth $510 million. 
25
Forward-looking elements played no part in this attempt to bail in the private sector.  The
only conditions imposed were the amount of new money and that it have a maturity of no less
than two years.  Not surprisingly, the bonds offered during the road show were subject to New
York law.  One of the earlier bonds which was paid off, in contrast, had been subject to English
law, allowing for easier restructuring.  
Pakistan.  Pakistan’s debt is heavily dominated by obligations to official creditors (see
Figure 9).  Impending difficulties in servicing debt to official (and mostly bilateral) creditors led to
negotiations between Pakistan and the Paris Club in early 1999.  As a condition for rescheduling
Pakistan’s bilateral obligations, the Paris Club then instructed the government to seek a
rescheduling of its commercial debt, including bond debt, on terms comparable to those granted
by bilateral creditors.
41 
Specifically, Pakistan was asked to deliver proposals for rescheduling its private bond
debt, including an outstanding eurobond, by the end of 1999.
42  But when encouraged to withhold
payment on a eurobond earlier in the year, the government refused.  Through much of 1999 it
remained reluctant to carry out the Paris Club’s instructions, fearing that entering into
restructuring negotiations would damage its credit.  In apparent contravention of the Paris Club, it
managed to scrape together the resources needed to keep current on its debt service.  But with
the military coup late last year, trading of its bonds on secondary markets essentially ceased, and it43  Standard and Poor’s (1999), p.1.  The impact on the country’s credit was immediate.  Standard
& Poor’s lowered its rating on Pakistan’s three soon-to-mature eurobonds from CC to D after the
exchange offer was issued.
44  In the event, the Pakistani authorities did not resort to a bondholders meeting, since the long
shadow it cast (the threat it posed to potential free riders) provided sufficient to gain all but
unanimous consent on the part of the bondholders.  The mechanism is analogous to the tendency
for a well-designed corporate bankruptcy law to encourage workouts in the shadow of the court.
26
became clear that new money was not in the offing.  The government was left with no choice but
to extend an exchange offer to its creditors.  It proposed to exchange bonds carrying coupons of
5 per cent, 11.5 per cent, and Libor plus 3.95 per cent, maturing between December 1999 and
February 2002, for a new eurobond with a coupon of 10 per cent but maturing in 2005.  It
warned investors that they would not receive more favorable terms, which the markets took to
mean that bondholders would be faced with “outright payment default and possibly protracted
negotiations on debt restructuring” if they failed to accept the offer.
43  Bondholders were given
several weeks to indicate their acceptance, by the end of which 94 per cent had opted to do so.
What made this approach possible?  Aside from unique political circumstances, a key
factor was that Pakistan’s eurobond was narrowly held, hardly traded, and in part subject to
English law.  Because there was provision for a bondholders meeting, and because agreement by
only a qualified majority of the bondholders was required to bind the entire group, there was
limited scope for maverick creditors to hold up the process in an effort to extract concessionary
terms.  This allowed the exchange offer to be pushed through in a matter of weeks.
44  
Significantly, Pakistan was widely seen as a candidate for this type of private sector debt
restructuring independently of and before the G7's attempt at increased private sector burden
sharing was implemented or even formulated.  The private sector was aware of the country’s
problems before the Paris Club addressed the issue and appears to have anticipated that the
country’s obligations would have to be written down independently of the change in official45  As the vice president of one rating agency put it, “the choice of Pakistan as a test case for this
new paradigm makes sense because the amoutn of outstanding bons is small, narrowly held, and
Pakistan is insolvent rather than suffering from temporary illiquidity.  Asia Pulse (1999).
46  Pakistan is also one of the few emerging markets whose eurobond spreads never recovered
from the Russian crisis of August 1998.
47  Thus, we disagree with Moody’s (1999a), which characterized the Paris Club decision as “the
beginning of a new phase in the world’s international financial system.”
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policy.
45  Figure 9 shows that Pakistan’s spreads started to widen even before the G7 and the IMF
had started to argue the case for increased burden sharing.
46  Given all this, the Paris Club’s
Pakistani precedent is less than earthshattering.  In fact, the Paris Club’s request to reschedule
private sector obligations in parallel with the restructuring of bilateral debt must be viewed more
as an isolated demonstration of the official community’s ability to give haircuts to investors under
exceptional political circumstances than the dawn of a new era.
47  For all these reasons, the
precedential value of the exercise is dubious.
IV.  Implications
          This review of the four test cases of the new strategy for achieving greater private-sector
burden sharing has a number of implications.  Requiring countries seeking IMF assistance to first
raise new money is unrealistic, given the palpable reluctance of investors who do not already have
a stake in the crisis country to lend into uncertain conditions.  Encouraging countries to suspend
payments as a way of driving their bondholders to the bargaining table will not work so long as
there is no bargaining table to be driven to.  The result, more likely than not, will be formal
declarations of default and the activation of cross-default and acceleration clauses, leading to an
extended period of messy negotiations and lost capital-market access.  And given the high costs of
default, it is simply not time consistent for the IFIs to plan to stand aside if the markets refuse to
roll over maturing claims, restructure problem debts, or provide new money.  The fact that default28
and restructuring are so painful and costly for the country, creating an incentive to disburse even
if investors fail to comply, places the IFIs in the position of having to back down on their previous
conditionality, which undermines their credibility.  And since investors are aware of these facts,
their behavior is unlikely to be modified by the IFIs’  less-than-credible statements of intent.  The
equilibrium in the game between the IFIs and the markets will remain fundamentally unchanged.
Among the undesirable effects of the case-by-case approach has been the destruction of
the rudimentary seniority structure which existed in the markets in question.  Ecuador’s default hit
domestic bondholders only when the holders of Brady bonds activated cross-default clauses,
contrary to the markets’ presumption that Brady bonds were senior to domestic debts.  Nor is it
clear why secured (collateralized) Brady bonds should be treated as junior to unsecured PID
Bradys or why both should have less seniority than eurobonds.  The IFI’s acquiescence in this
approach to restructuring left an existing instrument of burden sharing in tatters and most
immediately hit the segment which was secured by collateral.  The idea that some debts are senior
to others and that foreign investors who value security can be attracted by issuing senior debts has
been a casualty of these ad-hoc bail-in efforts.  
          Another unintended consequence of this approach is, ironically, moral hazard itself.  Only
treating new debt as senior to existing debt can entice new lending once a country has made it
onto the bail-in list.  This guarantee requires the explicit or implicit backing of IFIs if it is to carry
credibility in the institutional vacuum just created. It thus runs counter to the stated principle of
making private sector loans less, and not more, dependent on official financing.
A second source of moral hazard is that investors will recognize that the subjects of the
bail-in exercise are all small countries whose debt problems are unlikely to have systemic
repercussions.  They will therefore prefer to lend to large countries that are less likely to be the48  Not surprisingly, differences in spreads are visible between the four economies on the current
hit list and others, owing to the mere existence of such a list.  Witness the differential in spreads,
say, between Russia and Ukraine or between Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador before and after
assurances escalated that Argentina would not be allowed to join Ecuador on the road to default.
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subject of the bail-in experiment.
48   By lending to such countries, they will then contribute to the
very systemic risks that everyone agrees must be avoided.  Bail-in candidates, for their part, will
find it hard to finance legitimate investments.  They will have to live under the threat of investors
trying to withdraw at the first sign of trouble, which carries the potential of triggering or
accelerating crises. 
A final and especially regrettable casualty of these attempts to secure “private sector
involvement” has been the effort to change the legal provisions of loan agreements.  In all of the
cases considered here, the IFIs and G7 countries failed to stake out a position as advocates of
new contractual provisions.  In no instance were legal or institutional innovations that might help
to resolve future difficulties part of the restructuring agreement.  In particular, collective action
clauses were not mentioned in discussions of how new money was to be assembled.  In the case of
Pakistan, the conditions set by the Paris Club concerned only the timing and length of the
moratorium on repayment.  For Ukraine, no conditions regarding maturities and instruments were
applied.  In Ecuador, the multilaterals never broached the issue of new instruments or new
provisions for restructured instruments, instead sitting silently as negotiations got underway.  In
Romania, the only condition attached to new money was that it be raised with a maturity of no
less than two years, adding nicely to the next repayment peak.  There, and possibly now in
Ukraine, there is not only lack of progress but actual regress: the new money the country was
required to solicit would have come via eurobonds governed by New York (rather than, as with
previous issues, UK) law.  The IFIs and the G7 had their hands full with managing the particulars49  And to engage in limited lending into arrears.
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of these four test cases, leaving no intellectual capital free for longer-term considerations. 
          This is unfortunate because only if the legal provisions and institutional arrangements
governing sovereign borrowing are changed will efforts to secure greater private sector
involvement in crisis resolution bear fruit.  Without them, restructuring will remain unacceptably
costly and painful for the country concerned.  It will not be possible for the IMF and the World
Bank to stand aside if restructuring negotiations fail.  And since investors are aware of this fact,
they have no incentive to modify their behavior when presented with IMF statements to the
contrary.  Hence, the current approach to encouraging private sector involvement is doomed to
fail.  
          But if collective action clauses to facilitate orderly restructuring are introduced into loan
agreements, the balance of incentives will change.  Developing countries will be able to tolerate
the still-painful, but now somewhat-less-painful, process of restructuring.  Given this new
situation, it will be time consistent for the IMF to stand aside.
49  And knowing that the IMF’s
statements to this effect are now credible, investors will have a greater incentive to participate in
the resolution of sovereign debt crises, redressing the moral hazard problem that motivated this
effort in the first place.
          Regrettably, issuers and investors do not fully appreciate the merits of collective-action
clauses.  The G7 countries could signal the desirability and demonstrate the marketability of these
instruments by introducing the relevant provisions into their own debt instruments.  At the
beginning of 2000, the British government added collective-action clauses to a new euro-
denominated issue.  The United States has not yet followed its example.
          The IMF, for its part, can condition its programs on countries incorporating these31
provisions into any new loans they solicit.  It can make the adoption of collective action clauses a
precondition for qualifying for the Contingent Credit Facility.  It can make their adoption a
provision of the Fund’s code for good practices in the areas of monetary and financial policies. 
The Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors can key the risk weights on cross-border bank
lending to the presence or absence of such provisions.  The World Bank can provide resources to
countries to buy up old bonds lacking such provisions and replace them with new, renegotiation-
friendly instruments.  At this point, the moral hazard problem will be on its way to resolution.
V. Conclusion
Nothing we have written questions the need to address the moral hazard created by
multilateral assistance to crisis countries.  Our analysis does, however, challenge the wisdom of
the case-by-case approach taken in Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and Ukraine.  Requiring
countries seeking IMF assistance to first raise new money is unrealistic, given the reluctance of
investors who do not already have a position in the crisis country to lend into uncertain
conditions.  Demanding that creditors roll over their maturing claims as a condition for
multilateral assistance may be slightly more realistic, given incumbent investors’ stake in the
country, but still must overcome formidable collective action problems when the creditors are
bondholders.  Encouraging countries to suspend payments as a way of driving the bondholders to
the bargaining table will be disastrous so long as there is no bargaining table to which to be
driven.  The result will be formal declarations of default, the activation of cross-default and
acceleration clauses, and an extended period of messy negotiation and lost capital-market access.  
          Given the fact that default and restructuring are so painful and costly, it is simply not time
consistent for the IFIs to plan to stand aside if the markets refuse to roll over maturing claims,32
restructure problem debts, or provide new money.  Because these realities create an incentive to
disburse even if investors fail to comply, the IFIs are then placed in the position of having to back
down on their previous conditionality, which undermines their credibility.  And since investors are
aware of these facts, their behavior is unlikely to be modified by the IFIs’ less-than-credible
statements of intent.  The equilibrium in the game between the IFIs and the markets will
consequently remain unchanged.  This approach to “bailing in the private sector” will not work.
          Fortunately, there is an alternative: introducing collective-action clauses into loan
agreements.  Under present institutional arrangements, restructuring is unappealing except under
the most extraordinary circumstances.  Collective-action provisions would make it feasible to
pursue this alternative.  Debtors and creditors could decide when restructuring was desirable; it
would no longer be necessary for the issue to be forced by the IFIs.  Limited IMF lending into
arrears to countries engaged in good-faith negotiations would become feasible.  No longer would
the only alternatives be paying off creditors in full with official funds or enduring a costly,
extended interruption to market access.  This, and not ad hoc efforts to bail in the private sector,
is the forward-looking solution to the moral hazard problem.33
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FIGURE 1.  CONSOLIDATED CROSS-BORDER CLAIMS IN ALL CURRENCIES 
AND LOCAL CLAIMS IN NON-LOCAL CURRENCIES









YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99
as % of GDP
Total external debt
Private debt
Public and publicly guaranteed
Debt service










YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99
as %  of total 
PPG debt
Multilateral Bilateral Private creditors












YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99
Bonds Bank loans
as % of private creditors












YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99
Bonds Bank loans
as % of total debt
Long term public and publicly guaranteed debt and 








YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99











% Bonds ( left scale )
Bank loans ( left scale )













YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99
as % of total 
foreign debt
Long-term debt  Short-term debt
FIGURE 2A.  ECUADOR








YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99
as % of GDP Total external debt
Private debt
Public and publicly guaranteed
Debt service











YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99
as %  of total 
PPG
Multilateral Bilateral Private creditors










YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99
Bonds Bank loans
as % of private creditors







YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99
Bonds
Bank loans









YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99
Long-term debt  Short-term debt
as % of total foreign debt 
Long term public and publicly guaranteed debt 









YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99












% Bonds ( left scale )
Bank loans ( left scale )
Long term PPG debt over total LT  ( right scale )
FIGURE 2B.  UKRAINE
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FIGURE 2C.  ROMANIA
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FIGURE 2D.  PAKISTAN


































































Figure 3.  The Evolution of Eurobond Prices













Figure 4. Evolution of Eurobond Spreads
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Figure 6. Evolution of Eurobond Spreads
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Figure 8. Evolution of Eurobond Spreads
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Source: Reuters53  3 year $300 million bond issued  5/20/97 over 5 year US Sovereign issued 12/31/96.
Figure 9. Evolution of Eurobond Spreads
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